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TNF-alpha inhibitors represent one of the most important areas of biopharmaceuticals by 
sales, with three blockbusters accounting for 8 % of total pharmaceutical sale in Norway. 
With use of a unique natural policy experiment in Norway, this paper examines to what extent 
the identity of the third-party payer affects doctors’ choice between the three available drugs. 
We are able to investigate to what extent the price responsiveness of prescription choices is 
affected when the identity of the third-party payer changes. The three dominating drugs in this 
market, Enbrel, Remicade, and Humira, are substitutes, but have had different and varying 
funding schemes - hospitals and the national insurance plan. We find that treatment choices 
are price responsive, and that the price response is considerably higher when the doctor’s 
affiliated hospital covers the cost instead of a traditional fee-for-service insurance plan. When 
the doctors’ hospitals are covering the cost of this treatment instead of insurance the total cost 
of treatment is significantly reduced. 
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1. Introduction 
The agency problem faced by insurance companies and governments, and its consequences 
for health care financing has been subjected to extensive theoretical and empirical research.
5 
The moral hazard problem in health care arises due to third-party funding and doctors’ 
superior information about diagnosis and preferred treatment choices. Pharmaceutical 
expenses – both on individual prescription drugs and on more specialized drugs used by 
hospitals – are often covered by medical insurance. Extensive insurance explains why 
pharmaceuticals markets often are characterized by price inelastic demand (see references 
below), and, subsequently, why many countries exert various means to control these 
expenses. 
 
In an insurance-based health care system there are several candidates for being the third-party 
payer. When prescribing a drug on behalf of an insured patient, the cost may be covered by 
traditional insurance plans – private or public – on a fee-for-service basis or by the hospital 
with which the doctor and patient are affiliated. There are reasons to believe that the agency 
problem differs between a global hospital funding scheme and a fee-for-service approach 
adopted by traditional insurance plans. Treatment costs covered by the national insurance plan 
do not represent a direct cost for the doctor and the hospital. To the extent that treatment costs 
affect the choice of drug under a pure national insurance plan funding, this is explained by 
doctors’ understanding and adherence to national guidelines for cost-effective treatment 
choices. When treatment costs are covered by the hospital, the opportunity costs becomes 
more “tangible” to the doctors. Increased treatment costs on one patient reduce available 
resources for other activities at the affiliated hospital. For this reason, treatment choices may 
be under a tighter control or monitoring when costs are covered by the local hospital instead 
of a national, and tax funded, insurance plan. 
 
With use of a unique natural policy experiment in Norway, this paper examines to what extent 
the identity of the third-party payer affects doctors choice of treatment. More precisely, we 
are able to investigate to what extent the price responsiveness of prescription choices is 
affected when the identity of the third-party payer changes. Our case in point is the 
Norwegian market for Tumor Necrosis Factor (TNF) alpha inhibitors. To date TNF-alpha 
inhibitors represent the most important way to treat arthritis and other autoimmune diseases 
                                                 
5 See McGuire (2000) for a review. 3 
 
(Feldmann and Maini, 2003). Treatment choices with TNF-alpha inhibitors in Norway are 
made by hospital doctors, and all patients receiving treatment are insured against the cost, but, 
importantly for our study, the funding source has differed, both between the three available 
drugs and over time. 
 
When the market for TNF-inhibitors opened in Norway in 2000, the first entrant Enbrel was 
fully covered by the obligatory national insurance plan. The treatment with Enbrel is initiated 
by the hospital doctor, but the cost was automatically covered by the national insurance plan. 
The second entrant Remicade did not obtain the same type of coverage. Instead the treatment 
cost had to be fully covered by the doctor’s affiliated hospital. Importantly, the hospitals’ 
budget did not include earmarked grants for these patients. Cost of treatment with Remicade, 
therefore, competed with other expenses within the hospital. This sharp asymmetry in funding 
scheme reflects a quality attribute of the two drugs. Enbrel is administrated by the patients 
themselves (pump injections), while Remicade requires several hours infusion at hospitals. In 
fall 2002 the government modified the plan for Remicade by reducing the hospitals’ share of 
treatment cost to 20 %. Choosing Remicade after fall 2002, the government required a 
copayment of 20% from the doctor’s affiliated hospital. Enbrel maintained its full insurance 
plan coverage. The third entrant Humira is also administrated by pump injections by patients, 
and received the same funding plan as Enbrel when the drug entered in January 2003.  
 
The important policy change exploited in our study, however, took place in 2006. Then the 
asymmetry of financing between Enbrel and Humira, and Remicade was entirely removed by 
returning the entire funding responsibility to the hospitals for all three drugs. Since then all 
costs of treatment with TNF-alpha inhibitors have to be covered by the doctors’ affiliated 
hospital. By creating large and exogenous variations in hospital and insurance plan treatment 
costs, these funding switches becomes the crucial source of identification in our empirical 
model. 
 
We specify a simple discrete choice model in which the doctor’s choice among the available 
of TNF-alpha inhibitors depends on the prices. Furthermore, the price response is allowed to 
vary with the identity of the third-party payer. Our main result shows that doctors’ choice of 
TNF-alpha inhibitor is responsive to price differences, and that this price response becomes 
stronger when hospitals cover the costs. 4 
 
Running counterfactual experiments, we derive the economic magnitude of changes of the 
third-party payer. Remicade, which is the cheapest of the three drugs, gains 8 percentage point 
increase in market share by moving from insurance plan funding to hospital funding. This 
materializes as a 3-5 percent reduction in total treatment cost. Since these drugs are all on the 
top five sale value list in Norway
6, the choice of the third-party payer has a non-trivial 
economic impact. Savings are shown to be far larger than the reduction in expected consumer 
surplus for these doctor-patient couples. 
 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we relate our paper to the 
existing literature. Section 3 briefly describes the market for TNF-alpha inhibitors. In Section 
4 we describe the data used in the analysis. Section 5 presents the econometric model. The 
results are presented in Section 6, and we conclude in Sections 7. 
 
2. Related literature 
Our research relates to two strands of the health economics literature. One is the literature on 
pharmaceutical demand in general and in particular previous attempts to estimate price 
elasticities. The other is the literature studying the effect of reimbursement schemes on 
spending. Note, however, that these two areas of research are interlinked since many of the 
studies of price responses in pharmaceutical demand exploit variations in reimbursement 
schemes and patient charges.  
 
Ellison et al. (1997) estimate a demand model for a class of antiinfective drugs called 
cephalosporins. Their data contains four different chemical substances, and three of these 
substances experienced significant generic entry in the sample period. The model, therefore, 
allows studying both therapeutic and generic substitution. Looking at substitution between 
different substances, they find evidence of low (and often insignificant) price responses in 
demand. One of the drugs comes out with a significant own-price elasticity of -0.3. As 
expected, substitution between brand names and generics reveals much higher price 
responses. Besides being a different type of drug, treating patients with other types of 
diseases, cephalosporin drugs differ from our TNF-alpha inhibitors by having a relatively low 
level of hospital consumption.          
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Another study related to ours is Berndt et al. (2003). They do not study the effect of insurance 
on prescription choices, but estimate a demand model for a growing market with competing 
brand names available. They use data for H2-antagonist antiulcer, and their data starts at the 
entry of the first patent Tagament. Similar to our study, therefore, they investigate the 
pharmaceutical demand in a market with several competing brand-name (patented) drugs.  
They develop a rich model that includes a dynamic component of diffusion. Their market 
share model allows the drug choice to depend on prices, in addition to marketing. Doctors’ are 
found to respond to prices, but similar to the findings of Ellison et al. (1997), price responses 
appear to be relatively low. They find own-price elasticities in the range of about -0.3 and -
0.6. 
 
Both Ellison et al. (1997) and Berndt et al. (2003) investigate the demand responses to 
changes in pharmaceutical prices. There is a larger literature studying the demand responses 
to changes in co-payment by patients. A seminal contribution was made by Leibowitz et al. 
(1985), who used data from the Rand Health Insurance experiment to study the relationship 
between the degree of cost sharing with patients and prescription drug utilization. They found 
that patients with a more generous insurance scheme buy more prescription drugs. Another 
early contribution, using monthly time-series from the National Health Service (NHS) in 
England, is O’Brien (1989). He found co-payment elasticities in the range of about -0.3 and -
0.6.  A more recent contribution along this line of research is made by Contoyannis et al. 
(2005). Using micro data (individual patients) from Quebec, they estimate the elasticity of 
expenditure for prescription drugs with respect to patients’ marginal prices (cost sharing). 
These were found to be relatively low - in the interval -0.12 to -0.16. 
 
Iizuka (2007) is a recent contribution to the literature on agency problems in prescription drug 
market. In the Japanese market, doctors make profit from selling prescribed drugs. Using data 
with both prices and doctors’ own mark-up, he estimates a nested logit demand model for the 
hypertension market, including 40 brands in 5 different therapeutic classes. Iizuka finds that 
prescription decisions are influenced by the size of mark-up, but that doctors care more about 
patient welfare than their own profit. Hence, if the retrial price of a brand increases, the doctor 
becomes less likely to prescribe that drug. Other papers studying the importance of doctor and 
prices in prescription choices are Coscelli (2000) and Lundin (2000). The main contribution 
of Lundin is to show how the level of patients’ co-payment influences doctors choices 6 
 
(between generics and brand-name). He finds that doctors’ are more responsive to patients’ 
co-payment than the cost of the insurance provider. 
 
Lundin (2000) relates to our analysis by showing that doctors’ responses to prices are 
influenced by the funding source. In Lundin’s analysis the two funding sources are the 
patients themselves or the insurance provider. In our paper, we are instead able to investigate 
different types of third-party funders – hospitals and national insurance plans. Hellerstein 
(1998) provides evidence of the importance of insurance plans for the agency problem in 
prescription choices. She finds that doctors with a higher fraction HMO-patients relative to 
patients who are enrolled in traditional insurance plans, more often prescribe generics instead 
of the brand-name drug.  Since her data did not contain prices, however, she is not able to 
capture the effect on doctors’ price responsiveness. 
 
Our main contributions to this literature stems from the ability to investigate a multi-brand 
demand decision, with large and “exogenous” shifts in funding regimes. Exploiting this 
opportunity, we are able to provide new evidence on the importance of funding schemes for 
shaping doctors’ prescription choices.  
 
3. The market for TNF-alpha inhibitors 
Biotechnology is considered to be one of the most important technologies that emerged in the 
last decades of the 20th century. The biotechnological revolution was expected to yield 
significant benefits to the pharmaceutical sector through improvements in drug discovery and 
development (Lawrence, 2006; Lawrence 2007; Walsh 2003). The biopharmaceutical market 
is now characterized by competition among few firms that act at a global level, and biotech 
drugs claim an increasing share of novel treatments approved by the regulatory authorities 
(Kneller, 2005). The number of biotech blockbusters, i.e. drugs on the market that have sales 
over 1 billion USD per year, is rapidly increasing.  Recombinant therapeutic proteins 
represent the main business sector of biotechnological drugs, followed by monoclonal 
antibodies. Several proteins and antibodies are used in the treatment of arthritis and other 
autoimmune diseases, and the most important subgroup is described as tumor necrose factor 
(TNF) alfa inhibitors. 
 7 
 
There are three biotechnological drugs acting as TNF alpha inhibitor in the treatment of 
rheumatoid arthritis (RA). The first is Enbrel (etanercept), a recombinant protein of human 
origin: it was approved by the FDA in 1998 for the reduction of signs and symptoms of 
moderate to severe RA, and in Europe by EMEA in 1999; it is administered twice a week by 
subcutaneous injection. At the time of introduction, it was indicated for use by patients who 
had an inadequate response to one of the other disease-modifying anti-rheumatic drugs 
(DMARD) (Moreland et al., 1997), and in combination with Rheumatrex (methotrexate): 
clinical trials proved that the addition of etanercept to methotrexate therapy resulted in rapid 
and sustained improvement (Weinblatt et al., 1999). Enbrel gained approval also for the 
treatment of juvenile RA and psoriatic arthritis, and further studies demonstrated its 
effectiveness as compared with methotrexate in patients with early active RA (Bathon et al., 
2000), making it a first-line treatment for RA and a leading brand within the new class of 
DMARDs. Enbrel was developed by Immunex, a biotechnology company that in 2001 was 
acquired by Amgen. The product is marketed jointly with Wyeth Takeda. 
  
The second TNF-based RA product on the market is Remicade (infliximab), a chimeric 
(human and mouse) monoclonal antibody that proved to be safe and effective with 
persistently active RA not responding to methotrexate therapy (Lipsky et al., 2000). It is 
marketed by Centocor together with Schering Plough and the Japanese company Mitsubishi 
Tanabe Pharma. In Europe EMEA granted marketing authorization in March 2000. It is 
administered every four to eight weeks via an intravenous infusion that may take several 
hours to complete and requires qualified personnel monitoring of adverse reactions: this is 
considered as a disadvantage in comparison with Enbrel. Nevertheless, Remicade 
progressively increased its sales gaining high market shares. Price of Remicade is lower than 
Enbrel. 
 
The third TNF alpha inhibitor in the market is Humira (adalimumab), a fully human 
monoclonal antibody approved by FDA in December 2002 and by EMEA in September 2003, 
and marketed by Abbott in the form of subcutaneous injection every two weeks, setting the 
drug price in parity with Enbrel. Its attracting dosing profile was considered a key success 
factor, but relatively short after its launch, the growth of sales slowed and it seemed not to 
threaten significantly the market position of its competitors. 
 8 
 
Since these drugs are expensive, and the leading products show also some important side 
effects, like tuberculosis (Antoni and Braun, 2002), other products than TNF-alpha inhibitors 
are used to treat the disease (like Rituxan, Orencia and Kineret). The profitability of the 
market stimulates new research – a number of pharmaceutical and biotechnological 
companies are currently trying to develop new products that may threaten the market leaders 
Enbrel and Remicade in the future (Sheridan, 2008). 
 
Market penetration in terms of sales value has been highly successful in Norway. Sale of 





The dataset consists of monthly wholesale sale value and quantity sold, expressed in defined 
daily doses (DDD), for each of the three drugs Enbrel, Remicade and Humira. The data set 
covers the months from January 2000 to March 2008, indicated as running from t=1 to t=99 in 
Figures 1 and 2 below. The price per DDD is constructed from combining the value and 
quantity information. 
 
The following figure shows the monthly wholesale value of sale.  
 
Figure 1: Monthly wholesale value of sale; 1000 NOK. As of September 2010 1€~NOK 7.9 
                                                 














The market opened early 2000, with the entry of both Enbrel and Remicade.  Enbrel had a far 
stronger growth during the first year, and became soon the leading drug. In 2001-2002 Enbrel 
experienced problems of supplying the market. World wide capacity shortage forced the 
producer to reduce the sale of Enbrel in Norway. This explains the drastic reduction in sale 
value for Enbrel, and its volatility shown in Figure 1. In the fall 2003, the third drug, Humira, 
entered. Although Humira experienced a steady growth in the fast growing market, it never 
succeeded in capturing a larger market share. 
 
The figure below shows the development of market shares.  
 
Figure 2: Market shares for the three drugs (DDD).  
 
Within the first year, Enbrel reached a market share of 80 percent. The market share dropped 
rapidly, most triggered by the abovementioned shortage of production capacity. Since 
Remicade was the only alternative TNF-inhibitor in this period, it experiences an equivalent 
rise in its market share. Humira reached a market share close 9 percent after a few months.  
 
The price of Enbrel has always been very high relative to Remicade. Except for the first 
couple of months, the wholesale price of Enbrel per DDD stayed between 350 and 400 NOK 
until late fall 2001. Then the price dropped to a level closer to 300 NOK per DDD. Remicade 
started out with a price of 200 per NOK, but came down to a level between 160 and 170 NOK 


























Although Humira has kept its position as the price leader, the price gap (compared with 




Figure 3. Wholesale price, NOK per DDD. 
 
Note that pharmaceutical prices in Norway are regulated by a price cap. The cap is set to 
reflect the average of the three lowest prices on the similar drug in selected European 
countries, such as Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Belgium and Ireland. The Regulation of 1999 mentioned that to some (minor) extent and in 
certain cases one should pay attention also to prices on related (but different substances) drugs 
sold in the Norwegian market and with the same treatment effect and to the cost of producing 
and distributing drugs. For practical purposes, however, the regulation implied that maximal 
prices on drugs in the Norwegian pharmaceutical market are set according to an international 
reference pricing system. 
 

























Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
 
We have chosen to restrict the sample period in our empirical analysis to t=38-99. The data 
reveals several reasons for this. 
 
First, there are reasons to expect demand behavior – and in particular price responses – to be 
different in the early stage of a new pharmaceutical market compared with the more 
maturated market. In the early stage, doctors are unfamiliar with the particular technology of 
treatment (TNF-alpha inhibitors) – both its efficiency and its possible side-effects. In a more 
mature market, doctors have gained experience with the drug, and will be better able to make 
treatment choices for the individual patients.
8 Gaining experience with TNF-inhibitors, the 
doctors will better able to take treatment costs into account when choosing between the 
available alternatives. Second, capacity shortage for the manufacture of Enbrel during the first 
years distorts demand. As seen from the data section, Enbrel experienced a sharp decline in 
sale 2001-2002 that was due to a global capacity problem of the manufacture. After a period 
of decline, sale and market shares were very unstable, until problems were resolved some 
months before the entry of Humira. 
                                                 
8 See Berndt et al. (2003). 
Enbrel (obs: 99)  Mean Median Std.  Dev. Kurtosis Asymmetry Min  Max
DDD  53 249.77  46 557.00 34 755.95 -1.40 0.34 4 287.00  111 829.00
Price  315.39 308.30 34.98 -0.33 0.93 279.37  390.66
Market share  0.44 0.40 0.13 0.91 1.08 0.15  0.80
Humira (obs: 66)                      
DDD  25 739.75  25 076.00 14 090.69 -1.18 -0.12 717.00  47 531.00
Price  321.20 319.00 16.90 1.31 1.38 293.55  360.60
Market share  0.13 0.14 0.04 0.62 -1.22 0.01  0.17
Remicade (obs: 99)                      
DDD  62 542.05  58 247.00 42 225.41 -1.00 0.31 3 360.00  159 655.00
Price  165.41 164.78 9.56 3.72 1.40 144.63  196.55
Market share  0.48 0.47 0.12 1.34 0.29 0.20  0.8512 
 
5. Econometric model 
The decision-making unit on the demand side is the physician, who acts as the patient’s agent 
(Arrow, 1963).  In making decisions, however, the physician needs to take into account the 
situation of each individual patient. In the formal model of demand, therefore, consumers are 
represented by physician-patient couples, i=1,..Nt. The model is derived from a random utility 
model (see Train, 2002 for an overview of such models) in which consumers chooses among 
the available drugs, j=1,..,J, to maximize utility. Utility is given by 
 
 ijt jt jt jt ijt t 1U = μ -b p +ε ,i=1,2,,,N , j=1,2,3, t=1,2,,,61 
where μjt is an indicator of perceived treatment quality of drug j at time t. This is a common 
quality-indicator that applies to all patients that can benefit from TNF-alpha therapy. We will 
allow perceived quality to be time-dependent.  pjt is the price variable associated with drug j, 
ijt   is a random variable distributed across individuals, alternatives and time. The coefficients 
bjt are coefficients that capture the negative impact of the costs of treatment on utility. Note 
that bjt are expected to be positive.  
 
The costs of treatment with TNF-alpha inhibitors are covered by a third-party. There are two 
third-party payers. One is the National Insurance Plan (NIS) (termed “I”), and the other is the 
hospital with which the prescribing doctor is affiliated (termed “H”). As described in Section 
1, the funding split between the insurance plan and the hospital varies. At a given time t the 
drug costs are fully paid by the hospital, fully covered by the insurance plan, or split between 
the two.  
 
Let p
H be the price covered by the hospital and p
I the price covered by the national insurance 
plan.  
 
bH and bI represent the doctor's responses to drug costs under the two different funding 
parties. The main objective of this paper is to investigate to what extent doctors’ responses to 
drug costs is sensitive to the identity of the third-party payer – the social insurance plan or the 
hospital.  
 

















The coefficients bjt are then defined by 
 
(3)  I jt H jt jt b b b ) 1 (        
 
When the market for TNF-apha inhibitors opened in 2000, Enbrel was fully covered by NIS 
(i.e. α1t =0), whereas Remicade was covered by the hospitals (α3t =1). In the fall 2002, the 
funding of Remicade changed. Hospital was to pay 20%, whereas NIS paid the remaining 
80% (α3t =0.2). When entering in 2003, Humira was given the same funding plan as Enbrel, 
i.e. fully coverage by NIS (α2t =0). In June 2006, the government then gave the full funding 
responsibility to the hospitals for all three drugs (αjt =1). 
 
Since hospitals face budget constraints, the hospital’s opportunity costs of drug treatment is 
strictly positive when α=1. Reduced treatment costs will benefit other activities and patients at 
the same hospital. With coverage by the national insurance plan, the direct opportunity cost of 
the hospital will be zero. Choosing a drug that is fully paid by the insurance plan has no 
impact on the resources available for other activities at the hospital.  
 
We have the following hypothesis: 
 
H0:   I H b b   
H1:   H I b b   0  
 
Doctors have guidelines that require cost consciousness in their choices of treatment. 
Therefore, we expect doctors to be price responsive also in the case of insurance plan 
coverage. However, in the case where the hospital pays the treatment costs, we expect doctors 
to become more concerned about these costs. This might be due to the personal incentives of 
doctors’ to economize on costs in order to be able to spend extra resources on other patients, 
or just due to the fact that the hospital management has stronger incentives to monitor the 
individual doctor’s treatment choices when these involves hospitals own budgets. 
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By assuming  ijt ε to be independently, identically distributed extreme value (i.i.d. or type I 
extreme value) distributed across individuals and products, the probability that consumer i 
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We choose Enbrel to be the base product, here denoted product 1, and if we assume there is 
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, j=2,3; t=1,2,,,61 
and 
(6) 












The observed parallel to the average of agents’ probabilities that product j is chosen, is the 
market share of the product, mj. Because we only exploit aggregate data, our observed 
variable will be the market share, which gives us the following log-odd ratios: 
(7) 
jt
jt 1t jt jt 1t 1t
1t
m




Doctors’ perception of quality may change over time. There are several reasons for this. 
Manufactures may adopt different marketing strategies, both in terms of size and type, which 
change doctors’ preferences over the three drugs over time. We do not have information about 
marketing resources in the Norwegian market, but if we assume that the market strategy is not 
changed frequently, a time trend will be able to capture changes in demand that are due to 
differences in the marketing strategy for the three drugs. 
                                                 
9 Unfortunately, we are not able to construct an outside option to treatment with one of the three therapies. This 
would require a record of all patients with these diagnoses – including those without medical treatment. Our 
model, therefore, assumes that variations in prices covered by hospitals or the insurance schemes only affects the 
allocation of patients on different therapies (drugs), and not the total number of patients treated.          15 
 
 
Following the analysis of Berndt at al. (2003), we also allow quality perception to depend on 
accumulated sale. We expect doctors to be more willing to prescribe a certain drug the greater 
is the acceptance of that drug class in terms of the drug class’ acceptance, measured with 
cumulative sale. This link between general acceptance and perceived quality might differ 
between the three drugs. We therefore consider the importance of local acceptance, by 
allowing perceived quality of drug j depend on past sale of the same drug j AX .
10 These 
effects are introduced into the demand model by the following assumptions  
 
(8)  jt jt j jt 1 ct d A X       , 
 




jt jt jt 1t 1t j jt 1 1t 1
1t
m
ln( ) a b p b p c t d AX AX
m
       
where  1t jt jt a= μ -μ  ,  1 jj c= c- c   . 
 
The parameter  jt a  is assumed to determined by two elements:  jt j jt a a    .  jt   is a random 
i.i.d. term (white noise with zero expectation and constant variance, and with a possible 
covariance across the two equations), while  j a  is a deterministic drug-specific coefficient, 
that represents attributes and aspects that remain constant over time. 
 
















b 8 . 0 2 . 0  
 
To capture these three regimes, we constructed two indicators: 
 
                                                 
10 Recent contributions on the importance of doctors’ learning and uncertainty for diffusion of new drugs are 



















0   has  t  at time   j   drug   if   0
0.2   has  t  at time   j   drug   if   0.2
1   has  t  at time   j   drug   if   1
1   has  t  at time   j   drug   if   0
0.2   has  t  at time   j   drug   if   0.8
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Note that the product of the indicators A
I and A
H, and the prices p, defines the prices faced by 
the insurance plan and the hospital, respectively. Crucial for identification of the price 
response coefficients is the exogenous variations in relative (i.e. between the three available 
drugs) insurance plan and hospital prices. We have no reason to believe that the extensive 
changes in the funding plan are correlated with changes in drug specific attributes. Note that 
the two equations in (12) have to be estimated using a simultaneous equations framework. 
 
 
6. Empirical results 
The model (12) was estimated with 3SLS, and the results are reported in Table 3 below. As 
explained in the data section, we have estimated the model on a restricted period (t=38-99). 
Model 1 includes the price variable and time trends, and in Model 2 cumulative sale is 







Table 3: Results from the 3-stage least-square estimation, t=38-99 (t-values in parentheses). 
Model 1 Model 2




Price – hosp bH  0.0045   
(3.93) 
0.0054   
(4.70) 








Accum sale (j)   3.54e-06   
(2.35) 
R
2 (Humira)  0.7476  0.7700 
R
2 (Remicade)  0.2351  0.2357 
# observations  61  61 
 
 
The price effects are highly significant and negative, implying that an increase in the price of 
a drug reduces the probability that doctors prescribe the drug.
11 This is the case in both 
specifications. We also see that the estimated price response under hospital funding always 
exceeds the estimated price response under insurance plan funding. The results, therefore, 
support our main hypothesis that doctors become more price conscious when hospital covers 
the cost of treatment.   
 
The time trend is significant and positive for Humira and significantly negative for Remicade 
(relative to Enbrel). This effect is also robust to model specification. As expected, past sale of 
a drug (Accum sale (j)) has positive effect on doctors’ current willingness to prescribe that 
drug.  
 
In order to better evaluate the economic magnitude of the price effect, we have calculated the 
elasticity of demand. The price response differs according to the funding source.  
 
The own-price elasticity is given by 
 
                                                 
11 Note that with our specification a positive price coefficient b implies a negative price response on demand.  18 
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Using the results from Model 1 as the basis for calculation, we have 
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The figure below plots the point estimate of the elasticity with respect to the price covered by 
the hospital. The time is running from t=38 to t=99, which in the figures below is indicated by 
t running from t=1 to t=61. 
 
 
Figure 4: Price elasticity of demand (Model 1). 
 
The sharp increase in the price response in June 2006 (t=40) is due to the shift in funding 
source and is one of our main result. The shift in price coefficient when moving from pure 
social insurance funding to pure hospital funding has the effect of reducing the price elasticity 
















In order to gain insight into the economic importance of the funding plan, we have also 
calculated the expected market share and total treatment costs under different plans.
12 Figure 
5 shows the predicted market share for the three drugs, using the true funding plan for each 
drug in each month. 
 
 
Figure 5: Predicted market shares under the different funding plan (Model 1). 
 
According to the results of Model 1, Enbrel lost a market share of 5 percentage point when 
the funding of Enbrel and Humira shifted from the national insurance plan to the hospitals. 
Humira’s loss of market share was smaller, 2-3 percentage point. Remicade which always has 
the lowest market price, gain market shares when doctors become more cost conscious. The 




Using predicted market shares under the varying hospital funding and insurance plans, we 
have computed the difference in expected total treatment costs. These are reported in the 
Figure 6 below. 
 
                                                 
12 The prices of these drugs are regulated by price caps set equal to the average of three lowest prices in a 
selection of other European countries. Since the Norwegian market represent only a small part of the European 
market, changes in funding plans here will not affect the prices. 














            
Figure 6: Predicted reduction in total treatment cost per month by moving from pure 
insurance plan funding to pure hospital funding. Mill. NOK (left axis) and percentage 
reduction (right axis).  
 
Cost savings turn out be extensive. Monthly reduction in treatment costs amounts to up to 2.5 
mill. NOK per month (the solid line - left axis). Relative to treatment costs, monthly savings 
amounts to between 5 to 3 percent (dotted line – right axis). 
 
When doctors become more cost conscious, and change their prescription choices, the 
consumer surplus of the doctor/patient couples will – for given prices – fall. If utility is linear 














   
where Vj is the deterministic part of the linear utility function in (1), C is an unknown constant 
that represents the fact that the absolute level of utility cannot be measured. Using this 
expression we can compute the change in expected consumer surplus under different funding 
plans – insurance plan and pure hospital funding. 
 
 
                                                 





















Since the unknown constant C enters expected consumer surplus both before and after the 
change, it drops out of the difference and can therefore be ignored when calculating changes 
in consumer surplus. In other to get total consumer surplus we need to determine the number 
of consumers each month. The exact number of patients is unknown, but following Sorisio 
and Strøm (2008) we have computed this to be the total number of defined daily doses used 
per month divided by 30 (the number days). Total surplus is then simply given by the number 
of consumers times the expected consumer surplus in (15). Using Model 1, the difference 




Figure 7: Difference in total consumer surplus under insurance plan and hospital funding 
(solid line), and reduction in total treatment cost (dotted line). Mill. NOK per month. 
 
We thus see that the change in consumer surplus is economically important. Due to the steady 
increase in the number of patient, the difference is increasing over time, and reaches a level of 
1-1.2 million NOK per month. However, comparing with monthly savings in treatment costs 
by moving from insurance plan funding to hospital funding, the net gain to the society is 
















With use of a unique natural policy experiment in Norway, we have examined to what extent 
the price responsiveness of prescription choices is affected when the identity of the third-party 
payer changes. A discrete choice model is employed to capture the doctor’s choice among 
TNF-alpha inhibitors. The price response is allowed to vary with the identity of the third-party 
payer. Our main result shows that doctors’ choice of TNF-alpha inhibitor is responsive to 
price differences, and that this price response becomes stronger when hospitals cover the 
costs. The policy change is found to yield a 3-5 percent reduction in total treatment cost. 
Because these drugs are all on the top five sale value list in Norway
15, the choice of the third-
party payer has a non-trivial economic impact. Savings are shown to be far larger than the 
reduction in expected consumer surplus for the doctor-patient couples. 
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